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The Rise and Fall of the Spellings Commission
By Robert Zemsky
The invitation arrived in late June 2005. The secretary of education, Margaret Spellings,
was asking me to join her in Denver for a round-table discussion focusing on higher
education. Nothing seemed right: There was no list of invited participants, no offer to
cover travel costs, no indication really of intended purposes or likely outcomes. I had all
but decided to decline, citing family and other responsibilities, when an e-mail message
arrived from Jim Duderstadt, president emeritus of the University of Michigan, saying he
hoped that I would join him for breakfast in Denver the morning of the round table. I
bought my tickets that afternoon.
For more than a decade now, I have done what Jim has asked, knowing that his projects
and thrusts, if not always successful, are always interesting. In Denver, Jim surprised me
again, suggesting we arrive early at the session to meet with a certain Charles Miller, a
Texas investor who was helping Spellings organize the round table.
Miller showed up with a copy of an essay that I, along with Greg Wegner and Bill Massy,
had written for The Chronicle (July 15, 2005) based on our just-released Remaking the
American University: Mission Centered and Market Smart (Rutgers University Press,
2005). Miller had read the piece and marked it up, highlighting what he liked and just as
pointedly what he didn't like, all the while using the margins to push an imaginary
argument with me about the right way to approach the topic. His copy looked like that of
an attentive student who wanted to make sure of his assertions before launching his
critique in class.
Miller need not have worried — he was more than ready to take me on. What was wrong
with higher education, he observed, was that no one was really in charge. Rather than the
market making colleges more disciplined, the pursuit of new revenues was making higher
education just plain wasteful. "Where's the accountability?" he asked. "Who are the
change agents? Why is it taking the academy so long to recognize the need for systemic
change?"
And that's how I met Miller, who, like the secretary of education, is a confidant of the
president, and whom then-Governor Bush had appointed to the University of Texas
Board of Regents, of which Miller later became chairman. From the get-go he was larger
than life — smart, driven, funny, and engaging, not to mention manipulative, controlling,
and inherently argumentative.
In Denver, Miller's assignment was to test whether a national commission might
successfully begin an extended dialogue on the future of higher education. I eventually
understood that the session that Miller was about to run was in fact a kind of tryout. Like
most of the other participants, I was being auditioned — in my case, to see whether I was
sufficiently independent to judge an enterprise in which I had spent most of my
professional life as a prickly and, at times, just barely tolerated insider-outsider.
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The Denver session also happened to coincide with the announcement of the latest round
of federal testing of educational outcomes in which elementary-school students, in
particular, had made substantial gains in reading and math. More important, the results
indicated that African-American youngsters had narrowed the gap between their
performance and that of white elementary students on the standardized tests. Spellings
was energized, Miller was in charge, and the discussion that followed was about as good
as it gets — focused, forward looking, and decidedly collegial.
We talked easily and candidly about higher education's strengths and weaknesses, as well
as about the need for new investments in its research mission and more focus on
producing work-ready graduates. While we noted higher education's often cumbersome
ways, we also discussed why it should be more of a national priority. Most participants
came away from the Denver session believing a national dialogue on the future of higher
education just might be possible and a good idea. David Ward, the president of the
American Council on Education, later told me that an earlier round table that Spellings
and Miller had convened in Washington had the same character.
In September, Spellings announced the creation of her National Commission on the
Future of Higher Education and that Miller would be its chairman. In all there were 19 of
us. Almost half were drawn from higher education, another quarter from industry, and the
remainder from public agencies. The commission's task, Spellings told a forum at the
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, was to develop a "comprehensive national
strategy for postsecondary education." She went on to say, "Now is the time to have a
national conversation on our goals for higher education," and "I'm here to start that
discussion."
And discuss we did, in a half-dozen formal sessions, spread over the course of a year and
often watched by a hundred or more observers. There were also innumerable sidebar
conversations wherever two or more commissioners gathered, along with countless email messages among us on the commission and between us and others who were
worried about what we were up to.
Miller had his assignment. For the next year he would hold higher education's center
stage, cajoling, criticizing, and provoking. Above all Miller wanted a real discussion. In
his view, good civic discourse, while always polite, was necessarily pointed as well. One
could recognize the substantial achievements of higher education and still suggest the
need for improvement or, as he came to increasingly insist, recognize that there were real
problems that required real, even daring, solutions.
Miller was everywhere spreading the message that the commission would make a
difference. Always charming and prepared, ever the good listener, he eagerly sought
sessions with the leaders of higher education's principal organizations. But his true appeal
and power derived from his understanding of the news media. He was someone
journalists could count on for "a good interview." Like many successful politicians, he
had the ability to distill complex arguments and make them simple, and then wrap them
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in the kind of pungent language that reporters like to quote and readers end up
remembering.
He was always on message. Despite higher education's dependence on market income, he
insisted, there was no bottom line — just an endless pursuit of new revenue. No one
really knew whether higher education's products were any good or not. What, if anything,
students were learning was anybody's guess. There was no accountability. Accreditation
wasn't working. No governmental body — federal, state, or local — could know if it was
getting its money's worth. In an era of heightened global competition, business as usual
would not suffice.
He talked eagerly and willingly about the need for better tests of educational outcomes,
provoking across higher education a renewed interest in standardized testing. People even
made bad jokes about Miller's penchant for testing. At the University of Pennsylvania
one wag suggested the commission had as its mandate "No College Left Behind."
But Miller enjoyed a real give-and-take as well. Early on he appointed Richard Vedder, a
distinguished professor of economics at Ohio University, and me to co-chair a committee
on affordability, clearly expecting us to duke it out. And we did, though never without a
sense of humor and appreciation for the complexity of the issues that we were debating.
It was an approach that stimulated other people to join the discussion. In March, Derek
Bok, a former president of Harvard University who is currently serving as interim
president, added his voice, writing in The Washington Post that greater accountability on
the part of higher education was long overdue. A growing body of research, he noted,
indicated that students weren't really learning what they needed to. "Tests of writing and
of literacy in mathematics, statistics and computer technology suggest that many
undergraduates improve these skills only slightly, while some actually regress," he said.
It didn't matter that Bok had made many of those same arguments in his recent book Our
Underachieving Colleges (Princeton University Press, 2006) or that he dismissed Miller's
call for the development of a national test of learning outcomes as a search for a
"standardized test" that could only make matters worse. What did matter was that Bok
and others were taking Miller seriously and joining him in proclaiming that business as
usual was no longer acceptable. They were lending their prestige to the search for a better
understanding of learning outcomes, and, in the process, were bestowing on Miller's
quest a greater legitimacy than it could otherwise have claimed.
As if to underline that last point, Peter McPherson, new head of the National Association
of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, appeared before Miller and the
commission the month following Bok's commentary, saying that his organization was
prepared to take on the challenge of building a voluntary system of accountability that
included the measurement of student outcomes. In a discussion paper that he brought
with him to the commission's meeting in Indianapolis, McPherson noted: "We should
consider a voluntary system, by type or mission of colleges and universities, based on
outcomes. There should be a serious discussion on how to do this within the higher-
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education community and not just in the public policy/political community." Miller was
getting what he was looking for.
As it turned out, that meeting proved to be the apogee of Miller's and his commission's
track across higher education. With little fanfare and not much notice to the commission
itself, he began to turn increasingly to his staff and a variety of consultants, including an
old friend, Pat Callen, who, like Arturo Madrid, had been a member with me of the Pew
Higher Education Roundtable, and Bob Dickeson, recently of the Lumina Foundation.
Miller was organizing the commission's work just as a powerful chairman of a legislative
committee would. He chose the staff members, interviewed and hired the consultants,
organized the agenda, and issued the invitations to testify before the commission —
although, in fairness to him, he regularly asked what additional witnesses should be
called.
He remained on message, encouraging dialogue rather than combat. Yet the witnesses
testifying before the commission, as well as the papers the commission's staff members
and consultants were distributing as official documents, took on a decidedly negative
tone. David L. Warren, president of the National Association of Independent Colleges
and Universities and Miller's most persistent as well as effective critic, voiced the
growing concern of many of us that we avoid a too-negative approach when he said in an
interview that the commission had often been treated to a "parade of the disaffected."
And so we were.
After that, Miller adopted a much less conciliatory public persona, noting in another
interview that the commission planned to issue a report that had strong recommendations
about holding colleges more accountable. The tone wars had begun.
In May the commission, again in open session, began to outline a set of basic findings
and policy recommendations that most of us who served on the commission felt were
largely positive, at times even celebratory. We wanted to raise the bar, defining success
not in terms of the past but in preparation for a future of increased global competition.
We talked about the need for a true overhaul of the system of federal student aid. If you
listen closely to the tape of that meeting, you can hear one commissioner sotto voce
suggesting that we needed to "nuke it." We wanted to eliminate most, if not all, of the
back-door merit aid that had crept into the system. We were close to agreeing that we
needed to find ways of making the system as a whole less expensive by making it more
welcoming of change and innovation.
We wanted to support the findings of the National Academies' study Rising Above the
Gathering Storm and its call for more direct federal investment in higher education's
research mission. We discussed the need to increase college readiness among elementaryand secondary-school students.We wanted more transparency, more-complete financial
reporting, and better performance indicators, and we went in search of a way of
supporting the goals of a "unit record system" that didn't trigger the massive opposition of
those who wanted to preserve a student's right to privacy. It was, as I said at the time, a
good-natured conversation that seemingly put us on the right track.
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Unbeknown to us, however, Miller and his team of consultants, along with Ben
Wildavsky, a former editor in charge of the rankings issue at U.S. News & World Report,
had begun drafting a set of findings and a preamble to a report whose clear intention was
to jolt higher education. In June, partly by accident, perhaps partly by intent, a draft of
those findings and preamble began circulating — first among some commissioners, then
among the whole commission, and shortly thereafter as a public document. While the
May meeting had focused almost exclusively on possible recommendations, the draft in
circulation did not.
Indeed, the draft minced no words: "Our yearlong examination of the challenges facing
higher education has brought us to the uneasy conclusion that the sector's past
attainments have led it to unseemly complacency about the future. It is time to be frank.
Among the vast and varied institutions that make up U.S. higher education, we have
found equal parts meritocracy and mediocrity."
For many of us on the commission, it was not "our" text that was in circulation. That
draft's indictment was, as one commissioner later put it, all about "playing the blame
game," when what we wanted was a report that challenged higher education. Or, as
another member put it, "I recommend, as many of you have, that we adjust the tone of
our report to be one of inspiration, aspiration, and perspiration."
The findings imbedded in that draft report were, if anything, even more inflammatory.
David Warren's warning that a "parade of the disaffected" could take control of the
commission was proving all too prescient. Midway through a long litany of what was
wrong with higher education, the draft report in quick succession slammed institutions
for the cost and quality of the product, grade inflation, and binge drinking.
The news media loved it. Headlines proclaimed "Panel's Draft Report Calls for an
Overhaul of Higher Education Nationwide," "Draft Report From Federal Panel Takes
Aim at Academe," and "Commission Draft Report Calls for Shake-up in Higher
Education."
Miller appeared to look forward to the battle that lay ahead. In an interview with the
Austin American-Statesman, he conceded that he had "been advised to say things in
moderate terms, to not criticize the academy. ... It's almost like being censored. Some of
the language ... could be toned down, but the real issue is putting responsibility on the
higher-education system for things it's not doing well. It has some really bad flaws." And
just in case anyone missed the point, he continued: "If you wrap it up in academic
language, which is what the academy wants, you get long sentences and footnotes, and it
gets put on the shelf. ... Strong language gets attention."
The firestorm that followed the release of the first draft text confirmed the wisdom of
Bok's observation that attacking higher education seldom, if ever, leads to purposeful
change. Too many vested interests are ready to fire back. Within a month, the annual
conference of the Council for Advancement and Support of Education featured not one
but two plenary panels moderated by CBS's Bob Schieffer that roasted the draft report —
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panels that featured John Sexton, president of New York University, on one, and David
Ward and myself on the other. Without meaning to, the authors of the draft report had
demonstrated how easy it was to unleash the passions of discontent and how difficult it
was to pursue constructive discourse thereafter.
Still, my hope is that the Spellings commission will be seen as having made an important
contribution to American higher education. We should be saluted for having taken on the
task of making clear the strengths and vulnerabilities of colleges in the first decade of a
new century. I also hope that we will also be recognized for having supplied, if only
indirectly, an important set of clues as to why higher education seems so impervious to
change and what an enlightened public might do to encourage reform and transformation.
Serendipitously, Secretary Spellings and her chairman had begun a natural experiment
detailing higher education's changing contours and highlighting its fault lines. As a
commissioner, I was flooded with paper and electronic documents. A steady flow of
witnesses, each ready to tell us exactly what was wrong with higher education, appeared
at every one of the commission's public sessions. My e-mail in box was regularly loaded
with communications from fellow commissioners and all those who thought a little extra
effort at communication would tip the commission's deliberations in their favor.
Some of what I was hearing while serving on the commission I already knew a lot about.
I had already pretty much concluded that the argument over higher education's
affordability was something of a sham. Given the continuing growth in college
enrollments, it is pretty hard to argue that a college education has become increasingly
unaffordable. Expensive, yes, perhaps even too expensive, but not on the evidence
unaffordable.
I had similarly concluded that if the nation wanted to change the demographics and ethnic
composition of its colleges, those who pushed for change needed to talk less about access
and more about preparation and participation. It is not so much the price of a college
education or the often arcane ways in which economically disadvantaged students must
go about the business of assembling the necessary funds to attend, but the fact that too
many high-school graduates are simply not academically prepared to succeed in college.
Improving college readiness will not only increase the number of inner-city and rural
youths in college but significantly improve their chances of persisting to graduation, as
well.
But the commission also made me aware of other issues that I'd overlooked. I suppose
that I should have known, but I had never focused on just how dysfunctional federal
programs of student aid had become, or how much federal aid was being awarded using
criteria other than financial need. In addition, because Jonathan Grayer, chairman and
chief executive of Kaplan Inc., was on the commission, I got a firsthand glimpse of the
growing world of for-profit education — its motivations other than profits, its challenges,
and the degree to which it feels disadvantaged by current regulations and accreditation
processes.
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I was surprised and more than a little disheartened to discover just how unimportant the
research mission had become among higher education's would-be reformers. Despite the
presence and advocacy of Jim Duderstadt and Chuck Vest, president emeritus of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, on the commission, we never really dug in and
talked about what enhanced investment in higher education's discovery agenda would
mean or cost. Indeed, critics of the final report who pointed out that we were really just
dealing with undergraduate education and even then with only the first two years were
essentially right. In a similar way, technology, while often mentioned, was almost never
incorporated into our discussions or deliberations.
My biggest surprise, however, was the near absence of insights about teaching and
learning in either the materials presented to us or in the discussions within the
commission. We talked a lot — at times seemingly endlessly — about testing what
students knew and didn't know. But we barely discussed at all how students learn and
whether different learning approaches would yield better results. To be fair, Jim
Duderstadt regularly reminded anyone who would listen that we now had access to a host
of new insights, principally neurological, about how people learn. The problem was that
none of us were really listening, although I am still not sure why that was the case.
I also came to understand just how important it was to begin talking, in almost singular
terms, about an American higher-education system — huge, complex, diverse, but
nonetheless interconnected by the workings of the market, by a plethora of federal
programs of student aid, and by the machinations of accreditation. Most of my research
and writings had dealt with the workings of individual colleges or, in the case of market
segments, with groups or clusters of institutions. Similarly, much of what passes for
public policy focusing on higher education has taken on a disaggregated cast. We talk
about community colleges separately from research universities, which, in turn, are seen
as distinct from liberal-arts colleges, on the one hand, and comprehensive institutions on
the other.
That mind-set is reflected in the structure of the groups that speak on behalf of organized
higher education. The Association of American Universities is not to be confused with
the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, which is distinct
from the American Association of State Colleges and Universities as well as the Council
of Independent Colleges and the National Association of Independent Colleges and
Universities. The nation's community colleges have their own organization, as do a host
of religiously oriented consortia and advocacy groups. There is even a special and very
separate association — the Consortium on Financing Higher Education — that speaks on
behalf of the nation's wealthiest and most-selective institutions.
In such a climate, it is easy to dismiss systemic solutions as a mistaken search for "one
size that fits all." Woe to the would-be reformer who would talk broadly and
comprehensively about costs or outcomes or learning — even though such integrating
conversations are exactly what may be needed if higher education is to be seen as
anything other than a diverse set of businesses selling similarly packaged products.
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Thus my first lesson was that there really was a need for a national dialogue, one that
treated higher education as a whole by asking, "How do the parts relate to one another?"
My second — and, in many ways, more obvious — lesson, was that what was missing in
the discussions of change and transformation was a workable strategy for getting large
numbers of colleges to do things differently. Miller would argue that he did, in fact, have
a strategy, the first step of which was getting higher education's attention. The way to do
that was to use what he called "strong language," forcefully identifying the enterprise's
many flaws and broken parts — in short, a strategy of jolt and shame, or roughly the
educational equivalent of shock and awe.
By then, however, a considerable portion of the commission had begun spending an
inordinate amount of time trying to persuade Miller that he was wrong, that frontal
assaults on higher education inevitably yielded institutions that hunker down, all the
while telling themselves and their supporters that "this too must pass." The more the
commission played the "blame game," we argued, the more David Warren's caricature of
a process that had gone mad would come to be seen as an accurate description of the
commission and its chairman.
In the end, Miller more than budged, although once his first inflammatory draft was in
circulation, what mattered most was the tone of the report rather than its actual
recommendations. Each succeeding draft became more sanitized, more tolerant of
ambiguity, more ready to admit a diversity of opinion. Yet that struggle over tone and
message had sapped the energy of the commission, resulting in a less than bold set of
final recommendations.
What we ultimately proposed seemed almost commonplace: more federal money for Pell
Grants, but no real push for a simpler, less convoluted system for awarding federal
student assistance. Having declared that a college education at current prices was too
expensive, we urged institutions to tie their price increases to changes in average family
income, but the final report put forth no program for achieving that goal. Accreditation
was slapped, but then again, the accrediting agencies had few friends anywhere.
There were calls for more transparency in higher-education finance, for more data, even
more and better tests to measure student outcomes, and for a "unit-record system" that
would allow researchers and policy makers to track the progress of individual students,
even those who transferred or dropped out and then back in. But that proposal, having
just been rejected by the U.S. House of Representatives, is not likely to pass the new
Congress either. Nor is it likely that our call for spending an additional $75-billion on
Pell Grants and other forms of federal student aid will make it into law.
Instead of a shot across its bow, what higher education got was a mild scolding couched
in civilized language that proposed little that was new and much that was neither possible
nor likely. As a commission, we had done no harm. What remains to be seen is whether
we had in fact begun a national dialogue leading to the transformation of American
higher education.
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